Wittgenstein and the grammar of pride: The relevance of philosophy to studies of self-evaluative emotions

Gavin Brent Sullivan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


Abstract In this paper, Wittgenstein s philosophical approach and remarks are used to highlight features of pride that are not represented in contemporary psychological theories. Wittgenstein s scattered philosophical and autobiographical remarks on pride are arranged in order to engage with aspects of pride (e.g., as a self-conscious emotion) that can appear to have only empirical answers. Important themes to emerge in the resulting surview include the temptation to talk of pride as having or being a structure, the role of personal context in understanding intense emotions, the difficulty of finding a referent for proud feelings, choices of words to convey or capture feelings, the possibility of further descriptions of one s inner experiences, bodily and immediate features of the experience of pride, and the need to reconcile occasional immediate bodily and behavioural manifestations of pride with the popular view of pride as a thoughtful emotion. The results suggest that new perspectives can emerge through assembling reminders of the everyday use of a concept and engaging with existing research.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)233 - 252
Number of pages20
JournalNew Ideas in Psychology
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2007

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