TY - JOUR
T1 - Why do directors join poorly performing firms?
AU - Dou, Ying
AU - Zhang, Emma
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Prior research has suggested that sitting on the board of a poorly performing firm can be undesirable to directors. Yet, almost 60% of such firms are able to appoint new directors following director departures. Contrary to a quality matching explanation, we do not find that only poorly performing directors join these firms. Upon joining poorly performing firms, directors are more likely to fill leadership positions without necessarily receiving higher pay. These directors subsequently receive career benefits, especially those who are relatively junior in the pool. As such, the evidence is consistent with the leadership positions providing a certification effect.
AB - Prior research has suggested that sitting on the board of a poorly performing firm can be undesirable to directors. Yet, almost 60% of such firms are able to appoint new directors following director departures. Contrary to a quality matching explanation, we do not find that only poorly performing directors join these firms. Upon joining poorly performing firms, directors are more likely to fill leadership positions without necessarily receiving higher pay. These directors subsequently receive career benefits, especially those who are relatively junior in the pool. As such, the evidence is consistent with the leadership positions providing a certification effect.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124188967&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0022109021000739
DO - 10.1017/S0022109021000739
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85124188967
SN - 0022-1090
VL - 57
SP - 1564
EP - 1590
JO - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
JF - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
IS - 4
ER -