Projects per year
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the better-response dynamics converges to pure Nash equilibrium whenever there is one, whereas best-response dynamics fails to converge, as it is trapped.
- Best response dynamics
- Pure Nash equilibrium
- Random game
- 2 Finished
ARC Centre of Excellence for Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers of Big Data, Big Models, New Insights
Hall, P., Bartlett, P., Bean, N., Burrage, K., DeGier, J., Delaigle, A., Forrester, P., Geweke, J., Kohn, R., Kroese, D., Mengersen, K. L., Pettit, A., Pollett, P., Roughan, M., Ryan, L. M., Taylor, P., Turner, I., Wand, M., Garoni, T., Smith-Miles, K. A., Caley, M., Churches, T., Elazar, D., Gupta, A., Harch, B., Tam, S., Weegberg, K., Willinger, W. & Hyndman, R.
Australian Research Council (ARC), Monash University – Internal Department Contribution, University of Melbourne, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), University of Adelaide, University of New South Wales (UNSW), University of Queensland , University of Technology (UTS) Sydney, Monash University – Internal University Contribution, Monash University – Internal Faculty Contribution, Monash University – Internal School Contribution, Roads Corporation (trading as VicRoads) (Victoria)
1/01/17 → 31/12/21