Valuing talent: do CEOs' ability and discretion unambiguously increase firm performance

Kwok Tong Samuel Cheung, Dharmendra Naidu, Farshid Navissi, Kumari Ranjeeni

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)


This study investigates how the association between more able managers and firm performance, documented in prior research, is affected by the joint effect of managerial discretion and monitoring quality. We find that higher levels of managerial discretion afford more able managers to further improve firm outcomes only when such discretion is monitored closely to curb more able managers' rent seeking incentives. Our results are robust to a battery of additional and sensitivity analyses that we perform.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-35
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2017


  • Firm performance
  • CEO ability
  • Discretion
  • Business Strategy
  • Monitoring

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