Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence

Paul Egré, Pablo Cobreros, David Ripley, Robert van Rooij

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (Book)Researchpeer-review

Abstract

We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises ! whenever, if all the premises of ! hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a unified treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for truth, it supports the requisit of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationUnifying the Philosophy of Truth
EditorsTheodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martínez Fernández, Kentaro Fujimoto
Place of PublicationDordrecht Germany
PublisherSpringer
Chapter21
Pages409-430
Number of pages22
Volume36
Edition1
ISBN (Electronic)9789401796736
ISBN (Print)9789401796729
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume36
ISSN (Print)2214-9775
ISSN (Electronic)2214-9783

Cite this

Egré, P., Cobreros, P., Ripley, D., & van Rooij, R. (2015). Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence. In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández, & K. Fujimoto (Eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth (1 ed., Vol. 36, pp. 409-430). (Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science; Vol. 36). Springer.