Vagueness, comparative value, and the ''lawmakers' challenge''

Hrafn Asgeirsson

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1 Citation (Scopus)


In The Value of Vagueness, Timothy Endicott argues that vague law can be better than precise law. I think he is in many respects correct, but will suggest that we modify and supplement his framework in order to get a firmer grip on what I call the Lawmakers Challenge: the scenario in which lawmakers find themselves when they must determine whether the consequences of precision are worse than the consequences of vagueness. This will allow us to identify several points of actual and possible disagreement regarding the value of vagueness for law, each of which could affect Endicott s claim that vagueness is sometimes preferable to precision. The framework will also allow us to compare positions that seem - on the face of it - hard to compare, due to the fact that they rest on different theories of value and/or different theories of law.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)299 - 316
Number of pages18
JournalArchives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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