Using misperception to counteract noise in the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Lachlan Brumley, Kevin Burt Korb, Carlo Kopp

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    The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is a game-theoretical model which can be identified in many repeated real-world interactions between competing entities. The Tit for Tat strategy has been identified as a successful strategy which reinforces mutual cooperation, however, it is sensitive to environmental noise which disrupts continued cooperation between players to their detriment. This paper explores whether a population of Tit for Tat players may evolve specialised individual-based noise to counteract environmental noise. We have found that when the individual-based noise acts similarly to forgiveness it can counteract the environmental noise, although excessive forgiveness invites the evolution of exploitative individual-based noise, which is highly detrimental to the population when widespread. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 4th Australian Conference on Artificial Life: Borrowing from Biology (ACAL 2009)
    EditorsKevin Korb, Marcus Randall, Tim Hendtlass
    Place of PublicationBerlin Germany
    PublisherSpringer-Verlag London Ltd.
    Number of pages10
    ISBN (Print)3642104266, 9783642104268
    Publication statusPublished - 2009
    EventAustralian Conference on Artificial Life 2009 - Melbourne Vic Australia, Berlin Germany
    Duration: 1 Jan 2009 → …

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
    Volume5865 LNAI
    ISSN (Print)03029743
    ISSN (Electronic)16113349


    ConferenceAustralian Conference on Artificial Life 2009
    CityBerlin Germany
    Period1/01/09 → …

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