Abstract
This chapter borrows what Frank Jackson says about propounding arguments, a phenomenon in the dialectical domain, and transposes it to the epistemological domain. It seeks to clarify the notion of transmission of epistemic warrant and, particularly, the idea of failure of warrant transmission (transmission failure). In this transposition there will be, corresponding to the two purposes of arguing, two kinds of epistemic project. These are referred to as deciding what to believe (corresponding to the teasing-out purpose of arguing) and settling the question (corresponding to the convincing purpose). For each kind of epistemic project, there will be a property of arguments that makes an argument ill-suited for use in projects of that kind. Each property might be called 'transmission failure'. The two accounts of transmission failure (one analogous to Copi's account of begging the question and the other to Jackson's) provide principled limitations on the arguments that can properly be used in pursuing epistemic projects of the respective kinds (deciding what to believe and settling the question).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals |
| Subtitle of host publication | Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press, USA |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191708268 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199267989 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Epistemic project
- Epistemic warrant
- Frank jackson
- Irving copi
- Propounding arguments
- Transmission failure
- Warrant transmission
Cite this
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Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects. / Davies, Martin.
Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press, USA, 2010.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (Book) › Research › peer-review
TY - CHAP
T1 - Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects
AU - Davies, Martin
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - This chapter borrows what Frank Jackson says about propounding arguments, a phenomenon in the dialectical domain, and transposes it to the epistemological domain. It seeks to clarify the notion of transmission of epistemic warrant and, particularly, the idea of failure of warrant transmission (transmission failure). In this transposition there will be, corresponding to the two purposes of arguing, two kinds of epistemic project. These are referred to as deciding what to believe (corresponding to the teasing-out purpose of arguing) and settling the question (corresponding to the convincing purpose). For each kind of epistemic project, there will be a property of arguments that makes an argument ill-suited for use in projects of that kind. Each property might be called 'transmission failure'. The two accounts of transmission failure (one analogous to Copi's account of begging the question and the other to Jackson's) provide principled limitations on the arguments that can properly be used in pursuing epistemic projects of the respective kinds (deciding what to believe and settling the question).
AB - This chapter borrows what Frank Jackson says about propounding arguments, a phenomenon in the dialectical domain, and transposes it to the epistemological domain. It seeks to clarify the notion of transmission of epistemic warrant and, particularly, the idea of failure of warrant transmission (transmission failure). In this transposition there will be, corresponding to the two purposes of arguing, two kinds of epistemic project. These are referred to as deciding what to believe (corresponding to the teasing-out purpose of arguing) and settling the question (corresponding to the convincing purpose). For each kind of epistemic project, there will be a property of arguments that makes an argument ill-suited for use in projects of that kind. Each property might be called 'transmission failure'. The two accounts of transmission failure (one analogous to Copi's account of begging the question and the other to Jackson's) provide principled limitations on the arguments that can properly be used in pursuing epistemic projects of the respective kinds (deciding what to believe and settling the question).
KW - Epistemic project
KW - Epistemic warrant
KW - Frank jackson
KW - Irving copi
KW - Propounding arguments
KW - Transmission failure
KW - Warrant transmission
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84922145701&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0015
DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0015
M3 - Chapter (Book)
SN - 9780199267989
BT - Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals
PB - Oxford University Press, USA
ER -