Abstract
One of the main challenges in RFIDs is the design of privacy-preserving authentication protocols. Indeed, such protocols should not only allow legitimate readers to authenticate tags but also protect these latter from privacy-violating attacks, ensuring their anonymity and untraceability: an adversary should not be able to get any information that would reveal the identity of a tag or would be used for tracing it. In this paper, we analyze some recently proposed RFID authentication protocols that came with provable security flavours. Our results are the first known privacy cryptanalysis of the protocols.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 6th International Conference, ACNS 2008, Proceedings |
Pages | 479-489 |
Number of pages | 11 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2008 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2008 - New York, United States of America Duration: 3 Jun 2008 → 6 Jun 2008 Conference number: 6th https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-540-68914-0 (Proceedings) |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 5037 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2008 |
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Abbreviated title | ACNS 2008 |
Country/Territory | United States of America |
City | New York |
Period | 3/06/08 → 6/06/08 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- Authentication protocols
- Privacy
- RFID
- Untraceability