Traceable privacy of recent provably-secure RFID protocols

Khaled Ouafi, Raphael C.W. Phan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

65 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

One of the main challenges in RFIDs is the design of privacy-preserving authentication protocols. Indeed, such protocols should not only allow legitimate readers to authenticate tags but also protect these latter from privacy-violating attacks, ensuring their anonymity and untraceability: an adversary should not be able to get any information that would reveal the identity of a tag or would be used for tracing it. In this paper, we analyze some recently proposed RFID authentication protocols that came with provable security flavours. Our results are the first known privacy cryptanalysis of the protocols.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptography and Network Security - 6th International Conference, ACNS 2008, Proceedings
Pages479-489
Number of pages11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2008 - New York, United States of America
Duration: 3 Jun 20086 Jun 2008
Conference number: 6th
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-540-68914-0 (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5037 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2008
Abbreviated titleACNS 2008
Country/TerritoryUnited States of America
CityNew York
Period3/06/086/06/08
Internet address

Keywords

  • Authentication protocols
  • Privacy
  • RFID
  • Untraceability

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