The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A chat treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a contracts treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: coordination-type , which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and rationality-type , which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.