The role of cultural leaders in the transmission of preferences

Thierry A Verdier; Yves Zenou

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.026

The role of cultural leaders in the transmission of preferences

Thierry A Verdier, Yves Zenou

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Other › peer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission with cultural leaders who compete for oblique socialization. We show that by adding this new channel in the transmission of preferences, i.e. cultural leaders, in steady-state, there cannot be an equilibrium with total assimilation or total integration of the population.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	158 - 161
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	136
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.026
Publication status	Published - 2015
Externally published	Yes

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.026

Cite this

@article{7c8141e8ca564436919f1ffe862d73a0,

title = "The role of cultural leaders in the transmission of preferences",

abstract = "This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission with cultural leaders who compete for oblique socialization. We show that by adding this new channel in the transmission of preferences, i.e. cultural leaders, in steady-state, there cannot be an equilibrium with total assimilation or total integration of the population.",

author = "Verdier, {Thierry A} and Yves Zenou",

year = "2015",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.026",

language = "English",

volume = "136",

pages = "158 -- 161",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The role of cultural leaders in the transmission of preferences

AU - Verdier, Thierry A

AU - Zenou, Yves

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission with cultural leaders who compete for oblique socialization. We show that by adding this new channel in the transmission of preferences, i.e. cultural leaders, in steady-state, there cannot be an equilibrium with total assimilation or total integration of the population.

AB - This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission with cultural leaders who compete for oblique socialization. We show that by adding this new channel in the transmission of preferences, i.e. cultural leaders, in steady-state, there cannot be an equilibrium with total assimilation or total integration of the population.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.026

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.026

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 136

SP - 158

EP - 161

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -