Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 230 - 246 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | British Accounting Review |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 |
Cite this
}
The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms. / Setia-Atmaja, Lauw; Haman, Janto; Tanewski, George.
In: British Accounting Review, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2011, p. 230 - 246.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms
AU - Setia-Atmaja, Lauw
AU - Haman, Janto
AU - Tanewski, George
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000-2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.
AB - We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000-2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.
U2 - 10.1016/j.bar.2011.06.006
DO - 10.1016/j.bar.2011.06.006
M3 - Article
VL - 43
SP - 230
EP - 246
JO - British Accounting Review
JF - British Accounting Review
SN - 0890-8389
IS - 3
ER -