The problem of invoking infinite polytheisms: A response to Raphael Lataster and Herman Philipse

Mark Saward

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1 Citation (Scopus)


Raphael Lataster and Herman Philipse present an argument which they think decisively demonstrates polytheism over monotheism, if theism is assumed. Far from being decisive, the argument depends on very controversial and likely false assumptions about how to treat infinities in probability. Moreover, these problems are well known. Here, we focus on three objections. First, the authors rely on both countable additivity and the Principle of Indifference, which contradict each other. Second, the authors rely on a particular way of dividing up the possibility space, when there are equally as reasonable alternative divisions which give different answers to the one the authors arrived at. Third, the authors’ argument proves too much, giving us an argument against many positions we should not be able to argue against so easily.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)289–298
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2017


  • Argument from infinitely many alternatives
  • Monotheism
  • Polytheism
  • Theism

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