The moderating effects of the incentive system and performance measure on managers' and their superiors' expectations about the manager's effort

Anna Cianci, Steven Kaplan, Janet A Samuels

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7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The current study experimentally examines effort expectations (i.e., planned hours) for a manager made by participants in the role of the manager or the manager s superior.The experiment alsomanipulates the type of incentive system(i.e., bonusbased on either strategic or all measures) and the type of performance measure (i.e., strategic or general). We predict and find that the participants in the manager role engage in selfenhancement (e.g.,Pfefferand Fong 2005;Sedikidesand Gregg 2008).Specifically, thetotal hours thatmanagersplannedtoworkweremore than the total hours their superiors expected the manager to work. We also find that both the type of incentive system and the type of performance measure moderate managers tendency to engage in self-enhancement. Compared to a strategic incentive system, managers self-enhancement was diminished under acomprehensive incentive system.Further, participants inthemanager roleengagein self-enhancement for planned strategic hours but not for planned general hours.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)115 - 134
Number of pages20
JournalBehavioral Research in Accounting
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

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