Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1287 - 1299 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Applied Financial Economics |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 16 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 |
Cite this
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The influence of blockownership level and identity on board composition: Evidence from the New Zealand market. / Burton, Bruce; Gunasekarage, Abeyratna; Kumarasiri, Jayanthi.
In: Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 23, No. 16, 2013, p. 1287 - 1299.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - The influence of blockownership level and identity on board composition: Evidence from the New Zealand market
AU - Burton, Bruce
AU - Gunasekarage, Abeyratna
AU - Kumarasiri, Jayanthi
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - This article explores the relationship between the level and identity of the largest equity blockholding and the proportion of outside directors on the boards of New Zealand corporations between 2002 and 2007, using models that allow for nonlinearity in the relationship as well as interaction between the two exploratory variables. New Zealand provides a unique governance setting for the study, with significant blockholder presence and an inactive (relative to other developed countries) market for corporate control co-existing with a high number of outside directors. The evidence suggests that the proportion of outside directors on New Zealand boards is related to both the level of ownership and identity of the largest blockholder, with the latter influence dominating the former. The evidence regarding blockholder identity suggests that the number of outside directors is likely to be greatest when the stakeholder is governmental or corporate in nature.
AB - This article explores the relationship between the level and identity of the largest equity blockholding and the proportion of outside directors on the boards of New Zealand corporations between 2002 and 2007, using models that allow for nonlinearity in the relationship as well as interaction between the two exploratory variables. New Zealand provides a unique governance setting for the study, with significant blockholder presence and an inactive (relative to other developed countries) market for corporate control co-existing with a high number of outside directors. The evidence suggests that the proportion of outside directors on New Zealand boards is related to both the level of ownership and identity of the largest blockholder, with the latter influence dominating the former. The evidence regarding blockholder identity suggests that the number of outside directors is likely to be greatest when the stakeholder is governmental or corporate in nature.
U2 - 10.1080/09603107.2013.804162
DO - 10.1080/09603107.2013.804162
M3 - Article
VL - 23
SP - 1287
EP - 1299
JO - Applied Financial Economics
JF - Applied Financial Economics
SN - 0960-3107
IS - 16
ER -