The impact of public procurement rules and the administrative practices of public procurers on bid rigging: the case of Vietnam

Tam Thanh Tran, John Bevacqua, Hang Minh Nguyen, Hoang Tien Nguyen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Bid rigging prevents public procurers from obtaining the best value for money. While public procurers are advised to be vigilant as to bid rigging in public markets, public procurement rules as well as administrative practices of public procurement authorities, are integral contributors to the formation and stability of bid rigging. By looking at factors facilitating bid rigging in public procurement, this article determines the extent to which current regulations and administrative practices of Vietnamese public procurers facilitate bid rigging. The findings reveal that Vietnamese public procurement legislation as well as administrative practices of public procurers unintentionally facilitate the formation and stability of bid rigging. Particularly concerning are unnecessary and excessive selection criteria leading to limited participation of bidders, regulation of joint-bidding, information disclosure and frequent communication between bidders. Responsive suggestions are accordingly made to tackle the problems identified. These findings provide valuable lessons for both Vietnamese and international policy-makers by emphasising the need for assessing the practical impact of public procurement rules and practices on bid rigging practices.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)36-58
Number of pages23
JournalAsia Pacific Law Review
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Jan 2018
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Bid rigging
  • collusive tendering
  • competition law
  • public procurement
  • Vietnam

Cite this