Abstract
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants’ being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the ‘natural’ compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 776-801 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Compatibilism
- Experimental Philosophy
- Free Will