Abstract
Recent research indicates that compensation structure can be used by firms to discourage their employees from whistleblowing. We extend the ethics literature by examining how compensation structures and financial rewards work together to influence managers’ decisions to blow the whistle. Results from an experiment indicate that compensation with restricted stock, relative to stock payments that lack restrictions, can enhance the likelihood that managers will blow the whistle when large rewards are available. However, restricted stock can also threaten the effectiveness of whistleblowing systems without the presence of large financial rewards for whistleblowing. Thus, the large potential rewards for whistleblowing enacted by the Dodd–Frank Act appear timely as firms are moving toward compensation agreements that include greater proportions of restricted stock.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 853-862 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Journal of Business Ethics |
| Volume | 150 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2018 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Restricted stock
- Rewards
- Stock compensation
- Whistleblowing