The cost of policy simplification in conservation incentive programs

Paul R. Armsworth, Szvetlana Acs, Martin Dallimer, Kevin J. Gaston, Nick Hanley, Paul Wilson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

137 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Incentive payments to private landowners provide a common strategy to conserve biodiversity and enhance the supply of goods and services from ecosystems. To deliver cost-effective improvements in biodiversity, payment schemes must trade-off inefficiencies that result from over-simplified policies with the administrative burden of implementing more complex incentive designs. We examine the effectiveness of different payment schemes using field parameterized, ecological economic models of extensive grazing farms. We focus on profit maximising farm management plans and use bird species as a policy-relevant indicator of biodiversity. Common policy simplifications result in a 49-100% loss in biodiversity benefits depending on the conservation target chosen. Failure to differentiate prices for conservation improvements in space is particularly problematic. Additional implementation costs that accompany more complicated policies are worth bearing even when these constitute a substantial proportion (70% or more) of the payments that would otherwise have been given to farmers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)406-414
Number of pages9
JournalEcology Letters
Volume15
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Agri-environment scheme
  • Agriculture
  • Biodiversity
  • Cost-effectiveness
  • Ecological economics
  • Grazing
  • Incentive payment
  • Payments for Environmental Services
  • Trade-off curve

Cite this