Abstract
A constitution – considered as a visible, written legal text – exists within a broader social and political context. This chapter argues that, to a significant extent, it is this context that gives the constitution and the laws made under it whatever legal force they have; but that this context is not (and cannot be) contained within it. Every constitution, therefore, has a crucial yet invisible aspect.
The argument of the chapter is a philosophical one. Its goal, however, is not purely philosophical. Rather, it is to show that considerations of analytic jurisprudence, and analytic philosophy more generally, suggest a sociological conclusion, namely, that each constitutional order must be its own particular thing, by virtue of its distinctive invisible elements.
The argument of the chapter is a philosophical one. Its goal, however, is not purely philosophical. Rather, it is to show that considerations of analytic jurisprudence, and analytic philosophy more generally, suggest a sociological conclusion, namely, that each constitutional order must be its own particular thing, by virtue of its distinctive invisible elements.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective |
Editors | Rosalind Dixon, Adrienne Stone |
Place of Publication | Cambridge UK |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Chapter | 5 |
Pages | 146-166 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781108277914 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781108417570 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Publication series
Name | Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy |
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Publisher | Cambridge University Press |