Abstract
The argument of the chapter is a philosophical one. Its goal, however, is not purely philosophical. Rather, it is to show that considerations of analytic jurisprudence, and analytic philosophy more generally, suggest a sociological conclusion, namely, that each constitutional order must be its own particular thing, by virtue of its distinctive invisible elements.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective |
| Editors | Rosalind Dixon, Adrienne Stone |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge UK |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Chapter | 5 |
| Pages | 146-166 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781108277914 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781108417570 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Publication series
| Name | Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Cite this
}
The centrality and diversity of the invisible constitution. / Emerton, Patrick.
The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective. ed. / Rosalind Dixon; Adrienne Stone. 1st. ed. Cambridge UK : Cambridge University Press, 2018. p. 146-166 (Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (Book) › Research › peer-review
TY - CHAP
T1 - The centrality and diversity of the invisible constitution
AU - Emerton, Patrick
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - A constitution – considered as a visible, written legal text – exists within a broader social and political context. This chapter argues that, to a significant extent, it is this context that gives the constitution and the laws made under it whatever legal force they have; but that this context is not (and cannot be) contained within it. Every constitution, therefore, has a crucial yet invisible aspect. The argument of the chapter is a philosophical one. Its goal, however, is not purely philosophical. Rather, it is to show that considerations of analytic jurisprudence, and analytic philosophy more generally, suggest a sociological conclusion, namely, that each constitutional order must be its own particular thing, by virtue of its distinctive invisible elements.
AB - A constitution – considered as a visible, written legal text – exists within a broader social and political context. This chapter argues that, to a significant extent, it is this context that gives the constitution and the laws made under it whatever legal force they have; but that this context is not (and cannot be) contained within it. Every constitution, therefore, has a crucial yet invisible aspect. The argument of the chapter is a philosophical one. Its goal, however, is not purely philosophical. Rather, it is to show that considerations of analytic jurisprudence, and analytic philosophy more generally, suggest a sociological conclusion, namely, that each constitutional order must be its own particular thing, by virtue of its distinctive invisible elements.
U2 - 10.1017/9781108277914.005
DO - 10.1017/9781108277914.005
M3 - Chapter (Book)
SN - 9781108417570
T3 - Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
SP - 146
EP - 166
BT - The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective
A2 - Dixon, Rosalind
A2 - Stone, Adrienne
PB - Cambridge University Press
CY - Cambridge UK
ER -