The bargaining problem without convexity: extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions

John P. Conley; Simon Wilkie

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U

The bargaining problem without convexity: extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions

John P. Conley, Simon Wilkie

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

41 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that the feasible set be convex. Instead we require only that it be 7 comprehensive. We show that on this domain, Kalai's (1977) characterization of the egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and Smorodinsky's (1975) theorem if we use weak Pareto optimality.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	365-369
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	36
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U
Publication status	Published - Aug 1991
Externally published	Yes

Access to Document

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U

Cite this

@article{0110a36e9a6341c7b63d649cbc9072ce,

title = "The bargaining problem without convexity: extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions",

abstract = "We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that the feasible set be convex. Instead we require only that it be 7 comprehensive. We show that on this domain, Kalai's (1977) characterization of the egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and Smorodinsky's (1975) theorem if we use weak Pareto optimality.",

author = "Conley, {John P.} and Simon Wilkie",

year = "1991",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U",

language = "English",

volume = "36",

pages = "365--369",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The bargaining problem without convexity

T2 - extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions

AU - Conley, John P.

AU - Wilkie, Simon

PY - 1991/8

Y1 - 1991/8

N2 - We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that the feasible set be convex. Instead we require only that it be 7 comprehensive. We show that on this domain, Kalai's (1977) characterization of the egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and Smorodinsky's (1975) theorem if we use weak Pareto optimality.

AB - We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that the feasible set be convex. Instead we require only that it be 7 comprehensive. We show that on this domain, Kalai's (1977) characterization of the egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and Smorodinsky's (1975) theorem if we use weak Pareto optimality.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0001466123&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0001466123

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 36

SP - 365

EP - 369

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 4

ER -

The bargaining problem without convexity: extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions

Abstract

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this