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Temptation and commitment in the laboratory

Daniel Houser, Daniel Schunk, Joachim Winter, Erte Xiao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We report data from a novel laboratory experiment on economic decisions under persistent temptations. This type of temptation is ubiquitous, as it refers to any temptation that is present until one either gives in or makes a costly commitment decision to have it removed. Subjects in our experiment are repeatedly offered an option with instantaneous benefit that also entails a substantial reduction to overall earnings. We show that this option is tempting in the sense that a substantial fraction of our subjects incur pecuniary costs to eliminate the choice, and thus commit not to choose this alternative. We find that commitment and giving in to temptation generally occur at the first opportunity, though a non-negligible fraction of subjects delay either making the commitment decision or giving in to temptation. This delay is consistent with the costs of self-control increasing with its use.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)329-344
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume107
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2018

Keywords

  • Commitment
  • Laboratory experiment
  • Self-control
  • Temptation
  • Willpower

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