Strong leakage and tamper-resilient PKE from refined hash proof system

Shi Feng Sun, Dawu Gu, Man Ho Au, Shuai Han, Yu Yu, Joseph Liu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We revisit the problem of constructing public key encryption (PKE) secure against both key-leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present an enhanced security against both kinds of attacks, namely strong leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext (sLTR-CCA) security, which imposes only minimal restrictions on the adversary’s queries and thus captures the capability of the adversary in a more reasonable way. Then, we propose a generic paradigm achieving this security on the basis of a refined hash proof system (HPS) called public-key-malleable HPS. The paradigm can not only tolerate a large amount of bounded key-leakage, but also resist an arbitrary polynomial of restricted tampering attacks, even depending on the challenge phase. Moreover, the paradigm with slight adaptations can also be proven sLTR-CCA secure with respect to subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage. In addition, we instantiate our paradigm under certain standard number-theoretic assumptions, and thus, to our best knowledge, obtain the first efficient PKE schemes possessing the strong bounded/auxiliary-input leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptography and Network Security
Subtitle of host publication17th International Conference, ACNS 2019 Bogota, Colombia, June 5–7, 2019 Proceedings
EditorsRobert H. Deng, Valérie Gauthier-Umaña, Martín Ochoa, Moti Yung
Place of PublicationCham Switzerland
PublisherSpringer
Pages486-506
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9783030215682
ISBN (Print)9783030215675
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
EventInternational Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2019 - Bogota, Colombia
Duration: 5 Jun 20197 Jun 2019
Conference number: 17th
https://www.acns19.com/

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume11464
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2019
Abbreviated titleACNS 2019
CountryColombia
CityBogota
Period5/06/197/06/19
Internet address

Keywords

  • Chosen-ciphertext security
  • Hash proof system
  • Leakage attack
  • Public key encryption
  • Tampering attack

Cite this

Sun, S. F., Gu, D., Au, M. H., Han, S., Yu, Y., & Liu, J. (2019). Strong leakage and tamper-resilient PKE from refined hash proof system. In R. H. Deng, V. Gauthier-Umaña, M. Ochoa, & M. Yung (Eds.), Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 17th International Conference, ACNS 2019 Bogota, Colombia, June 5–7, 2019 Proceedings (pp. 486-506). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11464 ). Cham Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21568-2_24
Sun, Shi Feng ; Gu, Dawu ; Au, Man Ho ; Han, Shuai ; Yu, Yu ; Liu, Joseph. / Strong leakage and tamper-resilient PKE from refined hash proof system. Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 17th International Conference, ACNS 2019 Bogota, Colombia, June 5–7, 2019 Proceedings. editor / Robert H. Deng ; Valérie Gauthier-Umaña ; Martín Ochoa ; Moti Yung. Cham Switzerland : Springer, 2019. pp. 486-506 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
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Sun, SF, Gu, D, Au, MH, Han, S, Yu, Y & Liu, J 2019, Strong leakage and tamper-resilient PKE from refined hash proof system. in RH Deng, V Gauthier-Umaña, M Ochoa & M Yung (eds), Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 17th International Conference, ACNS 2019 Bogota, Colombia, June 5–7, 2019 Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11464 , Springer, Cham Switzerland, pp. 486-506, International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2019, Bogota, Colombia, 5/06/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21568-2_24

Strong leakage and tamper-resilient PKE from refined hash proof system. / Sun, Shi Feng; Gu, Dawu; Au, Man Ho; Han, Shuai; Yu, Yu; Liu, Joseph.

Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 17th International Conference, ACNS 2019 Bogota, Colombia, June 5–7, 2019 Proceedings. ed. / Robert H. Deng; Valérie Gauthier-Umaña; Martín Ochoa; Moti Yung. Cham Switzerland : Springer, 2019. p. 486-506 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11464 ).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

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AB - We revisit the problem of constructing public key encryption (PKE) secure against both key-leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present an enhanced security against both kinds of attacks, namely strong leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext (sLTR-CCA) security, which imposes only minimal restrictions on the adversary’s queries and thus captures the capability of the adversary in a more reasonable way. Then, we propose a generic paradigm achieving this security on the basis of a refined hash proof system (HPS) called public-key-malleable HPS. The paradigm can not only tolerate a large amount of bounded key-leakage, but also resist an arbitrary polynomial of restricted tampering attacks, even depending on the challenge phase. Moreover, the paradigm with slight adaptations can also be proven sLTR-CCA secure with respect to subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage. In addition, we instantiate our paradigm under certain standard number-theoretic assumptions, and thus, to our best knowledge, obtain the first efficient PKE schemes possessing the strong bounded/auxiliary-input leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.

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A2 - Gauthier-Umaña, Valérie

A2 - Ochoa, Martín

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PB - Springer

CY - Cham Switzerland

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Sun SF, Gu D, Au MH, Han S, Yu Y, Liu J. Strong leakage and tamper-resilient PKE from refined hash proof system. In Deng RH, Gauthier-Umaña V, Ochoa M, Yung M, editors, Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 17th International Conference, ACNS 2019 Bogota, Colombia, June 5–7, 2019 Proceedings. Cham Switzerland: Springer. 2019. p. 486-506. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21568-2_24