Stoicism in nineteenth century German philosophy

This chapter examines nineteenth-century German philosophy’s understanding and evaluation of ancient Stoic philosophy, focusing exclusively on Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In post-Kantian German philosophy ancient Stoicism became a test case for competing modern claims about reason, freedom and happiness. Famously Hegel and Schopenhauer took diametrically opposed positions on the idea of history as the progressive realization of reason and freedom: the former attempts to demonstrate the progressive unfolding of “Spirit” in history; the latter famously seeks to debunk the modern philosophical conceit that the Spirit progressively realizes freedom in history. Yet despite their radical metaphysical disagreement they both regard ancient Stoicism as a noble, yet failed attempt to use reason to rise above the limits of empirical existence. Despite Stoicism’s honorable efforts to realize freedom and happiness, Hegel and Schopenhauer both argue that it only succeeds in conceptualizing a lifeless, immobile, empty figure: namely, the sage, a mannequin rather than a living creature. Nietzsche’s engagement with ancient Stoicism is more complex. In his positivistic period hechampions the ancient Stoics’ eudaimonistic ethics as a counterforce to modern “communitarian” ethics. As his naturalistic turn gathered momentum in the 1880s, however, Nietzsche rejected Stoicism as a failed philosophical therapy motivated by a fear of human flourishing. Nietzsche ultimately judged that the Stoics rightly identified philosophy as a therapeutic exercise, but failed to see their own therapy as both a cause and symptom of illness. Nietzsche’s critique of Stoicism opened onto a new naturalistic standpoint for analyzing and evaluating philosophies as conditions of existence. Nietzsche hoped that his analysis of Stoicism’s “failed” therapy might contribute to the development of a new, post-classical philosophical therapy.