TY - JOUR
T1 - Standardizing scenarios to assess the need to respond to an influenza pandemic
AU - Meltzer, Martin I
AU - Gambhir, Manoj
AU - Atkins, Charisma Y
AU - Swerdlow, David L
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - An outbreak of human infections with an avian influenza
A(H7N9) virus was first reported in eastern China by the
World Health Organization on 1 April 2013 [1]. This
novel influenza virus was fatal in approximately onethird
of the 135 confirmed cases detected in the 4 months
following its initial identification [2],and limited humanto-
human H7N9 virus transmission could not be excluded
in some Chinese clusters of cases [3,4]. There was, and
still is, the possibility that the virus would mutate to the
point where there would be sustained human-to-human
transmission. Given that most of the human population
has no prior immunity (either due to natural challenge or
vaccine induced), such a strain presents the danger of
starting an influenza pandemic.
In response to such a threat, the Joint Modeling Unit at
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
was asked to conduct a rapid assessment of both the potential
burden of unmitigated disease and the possible impacts
of different mitigation measures.We were tasked to
evaluate the 6 following interventions: invasive mechanical
ventilators, influenza antiviral drugs for treatment
(but not large-scale prophylaxis), influenza vaccines, respiratory
protective devices for healthcare workers and
surgical face masks for patients, school closings to reduce
transmission, and airport-based screening to identify
those ill with novel influenza virus entering the United
States. This supplement presents reports on the methods
and estimates for the first 5 listed interventions, and in
this introduction we outline the general approach and
standardized epidemiological assumptions used in all
the articles.
AB - An outbreak of human infections with an avian influenza
A(H7N9) virus was first reported in eastern China by the
World Health Organization on 1 April 2013 [1]. This
novel influenza virus was fatal in approximately onethird
of the 135 confirmed cases detected in the 4 months
following its initial identification [2],and limited humanto-
human H7N9 virus transmission could not be excluded
in some Chinese clusters of cases [3,4]. There was, and
still is, the possibility that the virus would mutate to the
point where there would be sustained human-to-human
transmission. Given that most of the human population
has no prior immunity (either due to natural challenge or
vaccine induced), such a strain presents the danger of
starting an influenza pandemic.
In response to such a threat, the Joint Modeling Unit at
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
was asked to conduct a rapid assessment of both the potential
burden of unmitigated disease and the possible impacts
of different mitigation measures.We were tasked to
evaluate the 6 following interventions: invasive mechanical
ventilators, influenza antiviral drugs for treatment
(but not large-scale prophylaxis), influenza vaccines, respiratory
protective devices for healthcare workers and
surgical face masks for patients, school closings to reduce
transmission, and airport-based screening to identify
those ill with novel influenza virus entering the United
States. This supplement presents reports on the methods
and estimates for the first 5 listed interventions, and in
this introduction we outline the general approach and
standardized epidemiological assumptions used in all
the articles.
UR - http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/60/suppl_1/S1.full.pdf+html
U2 - 10.1093/cid/civ088
DO - 10.1093/cid/civ088
M3 - Article
VL - 60
SP - S1 - S8
JO - Clinical Infectious Diseases
JF - Clinical Infectious Diseases
SN - 1058-4838
ER -