Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study

Klaus Abbink

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    91 Citations (Scopus)


    Within the German federal government regular staff rotation is a precautionary measure against corruption in public administration. To study the effect of this policy, an experiment was conducted where pairs of potential bribers and public officials were randomly re-matched in every round. The outcome is compared to the case where the identity of the pairs interacting remained fixed. The conclusion is that rotation of interacting pairs significantly reduces the levels of bribes as well as the frequency of inefficient decisions due to bribery.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)887-906
    Number of pages20
    JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
    Issue number4
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2004


    • Corruption
    • Repeated games
    • Staff rotation
    • Strangers and partners

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