Specialization, information, and growth: A sequential equilibrium analysis

Yew Kwang Ng, Xiaokai Yang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)


Pricing costs and information problems are introduced into a framework with consumer-producers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs, to predict the endogenous and concurrent evolution of the division of labor and of information concerning economic organization acquired by society. Concurrent evolution generates endogenous growth based on the tradeoff between gains from information about the efficient pattern of the division of labor - which can be acquired via experiments with various patterns - and experimentation costs, which relate to the costs of discovering prices. The concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is developed to analyze the social learning process which is characterized by uncertainties in the direction of the evolution and by a certain trend of the evolutionary process.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257-274
Number of pages18
JournalReview of Development Economics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1997

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