Socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth

Siew Ling Yew, Jie Zhang

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5 Citations (Scopus)


This paper considers socially optimal government policies in a dynastic family model with physical capital, human capital, endogenous fertility and positive spillovers from average human capital. Such spillovers reduce human capital investment but raise fertility from their social optimum. We first characterize the social optimum with a non-convex feasible set due to the quantity?quality tradeoff concerning children. We then show that social security and education subsidization together, financed by labor income taxes, can fully eliminate the efficiency losses of the spillovers and achieve the social optimum under plausible conditions. However, none of the policies can do so alone.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)154 - 175
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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