TY - JOUR
T1 - Social networks and crime decisions
T2 - the role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behavior
AU - Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
AU - Zenou, Yves
PY - 2004/8/1
Y1 - 2004/8/1
N2 - Delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. We study the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals.
AB - Delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. We study the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=4544238467&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00292.x
DO - 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00292.x
M3 - Review Article
AN - SCOPUS:4544238467
VL - 45
SP - 939
EP - 958
JO - International Economic Review
JF - International Economic Review
SN - 0020-6598
IS - 3
ER -