Abstract
We study how voters’ turnout decisions affect the turnout decisions of other voters by exploiting the unique staggered nature of India's elections. Voting takes places in several phases, with constituencies quasi-randomly assigned to phases. At the time that later phases vote, turnout in earlier phases is public knowledge but results are not. Using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that a 1 percentage point (pp)increase in turnout in the previous phase depresses turnout in the current phase by around 0.38 pp. Falsification tests examining the effect on turnout, of either constituencies in the same phase or in future phases in the same election, produce no effect. Our results are broadly consistent with pivotal voter and ethical voter models, and suggest that partial equilibrium evaluations of turnout interventions may overstate general equilibrium effects.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 158-171 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 163 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2019 |
Keywords
- Election spillovers
- Staggered elections
- Voting behavior
Cite this
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Social interactions in voting behavior : evidence from India. / Khalil, Umair; Mookerjee, Sulagna; Tierney, Ryan.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 163, 07.2019, p. 158-171.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Social interactions in voting behavior
T2 - evidence from India
AU - Khalil, Umair
AU - Mookerjee, Sulagna
AU - Tierney, Ryan
PY - 2019/7
Y1 - 2019/7
N2 - We study how voters’ turnout decisions affect the turnout decisions of other voters by exploiting the unique staggered nature of India's elections. Voting takes places in several phases, with constituencies quasi-randomly assigned to phases. At the time that later phases vote, turnout in earlier phases is public knowledge but results are not. Using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that a 1 percentage point (pp)increase in turnout in the previous phase depresses turnout in the current phase by around 0.38 pp. Falsification tests examining the effect on turnout, of either constituencies in the same phase or in future phases in the same election, produce no effect. Our results are broadly consistent with pivotal voter and ethical voter models, and suggest that partial equilibrium evaluations of turnout interventions may overstate general equilibrium effects.
AB - We study how voters’ turnout decisions affect the turnout decisions of other voters by exploiting the unique staggered nature of India's elections. Voting takes places in several phases, with constituencies quasi-randomly assigned to phases. At the time that later phases vote, turnout in earlier phases is public knowledge but results are not. Using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that a 1 percentage point (pp)increase in turnout in the previous phase depresses turnout in the current phase by around 0.38 pp. Falsification tests examining the effect on turnout, of either constituencies in the same phase or in future phases in the same election, produce no effect. Our results are broadly consistent with pivotal voter and ethical voter models, and suggest that partial equilibrium evaluations of turnout interventions may overstate general equilibrium effects.
KW - Election spillovers
KW - Staggered elections
KW - Voting behavior
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065595629&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.024
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.024
M3 - Article
VL - 163
SP - 158
EP - 171
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -