Should independent directors have term limits? The role of experience in corporate governance

Ying Dou, Sidharth Sahgal, Emma Jincheng Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the role of independent directors with extended tenure in board-level governance, monitoring decisions, and advising outcomes. These directors exhibit a higher level of commitment as they attend more board meetings and take more committee memberships. Firms with a higher proportion of these directors have lower chief executive officer (CEO) pay, higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and a smaller likelihood of intentionally misreporting earnings. These firms also restrict the expansion of resources under the CEO's control as they are less likely to make acquisitions, while the acquisitions they do make are of higher quality. Efforts to impose term limits on directors may, therefore, be misguided.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)583-621
Number of pages39
JournalFinancial Management
Volume44
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2015
Externally publishedYes

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