Short generic transformation to strongly unforgeable signature in the standard model

Joseph K Liu, Man Ho Allen Au, Willy Susilo, Jianying Zhou

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


Standard signature schemes are usually devised to merely achieve existential unforgeability, i.e., to prevent forgeries on new messages not previously signed. Unfortunately, existential unforgeability is not suitable for several applications, since a new signature on a previously signed message may be produced. Therefore, there is a need to construct signature schemes with strong unforgeability, that is, it is hard to produce a new signature on any message, even if it has been signed before by legitimate signer. Recently, there have been several generic transformations proposed to convert weak unforgeability into strong unforgeability. For instance, various generic transforms of signatures that are existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack (uf-cma) to strongly unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack (suf-cma) have been proposed. Moreover, methods of converting signatures that are existentially unforgeable under generic chosen message attack (uf-gma) to uf-cma secure digital signatures have also been studied. Combination of these methods yields generic transform of digital signatures offering uf-gma security to suf-cma security. In this paper, we present a short universal transform that directly converts any uf-gma secure signatures into suf-cma secure. Our transform is the shortest generic transformation, in terms of signature size expansion, which results in suf-cma secure signature in the standard model. While our generic transformation can convert any uf-gma secure signature to suf-cma secure signature directly, the efficiency of ours is comparable to those which only transform signatures from uf-gma secure to uf-cma secure in the standard model.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2010)
EditorsDimitris Gritzalis, Bart Preneel, Mariathi Theoharidou
Place of PublicationHeidelberg Germany
Pages168 - 181
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9783642154966
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
EventEuropean Symposium On Research In Computer Security 2010 - Athens, Greece
Duration: 20 Sep 201022 Sep 2010
Conference number: 15th (Proceedings)


ConferenceEuropean Symposium On Research In Computer Security 2010
Abbreviated titleESORICS 2010
Internet address

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