Self-protection promotes altruism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Self-protection tendencies allowed our human ancestors to survive and thrive. In three experiments, we find that individuals who have a salient self-protection motive are more altruistic to others, such as by helping them out or offering them more money in the dictator game paradigm. Self-protecting individuals desire to “bind together” as there is “safety in numbers”, and being altruistic to others should be one (but not the only) way to achieve this goal. Consistent with this reasoning, we find across three behavioral experiments using both non-monetary (Experiment 1) and monetary altruistic contexts (Experiments 2–3) that self-protecting individuals are more altruistic when the altruism is not anonymous (Experiment 1) and when they have the reasonable expectation of future interaction with the recipient (Experiment 2), both of which are situations that should increase affiliation. The effect attenuates when altruism does not help self-protecting individuals, such as when money is donated to impersonal organizations rather than individuals (Experiment 3). We finally discuss the theoretical contributions as well as limitations of our work.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)667-673
Number of pages7
JournalEvolution and Human Behavior
Volume38
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2017

Keywords

  • Affiliation
  • Altruism
  • Reciprocity
  • Safety in numbers
  • Self-protection

Cite this

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Self-protection promotes altruism. / Chan, Eugene Y.

In: Evolution and Human Behavior, Vol. 38, No. 5, 01.09.2017, p. 667-673.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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