Security of two recent constant-round password authenticated group key exchange schemes

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Abstract

When humans interact with machines in their daily networks, it is important that security of the communications is offered, and where the involved shared secrets used to achieve this are easily remembered by humans. Password-based authenticated group key exchange (PAGKE) schemes allow group users to share a session key based on a human-memorizable password. In this paper, we consider two PAGKE schemes that build on the seminal scheme of Burmester and Desmedt. We show an undetectable online dictionary attack on the first scheme, and exploit the partnering definition to break the key indistinguishability of the second scheme.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops, WAINA 2009
Pages134-139
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops 2009 - Bradford, United Kingdom
Duration: 26 May 200929 May 2009
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/5136571/proceeding (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameProceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA
ISSN (Print)1550-445X

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops 2009
Abbreviated titleWAINA 2009
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityBradford
Period26/05/0929/05/09
Internet address

Keywords

  • Cryptanalysis
  • Group
  • Model
  • Password-authenticated key exchange
  • Proof

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