Abstract
Password-based authenticated group key exchange protocols allow group users to jointly share a session key based on a human-memorizable password. In this paper, we present an undetectable online dictionary attack on N-EKE-D, a recent provably secure protocol designed to explicitly resist this type of attack. Thus, our result contradicts the design goal. We also give a simple attack on the key indistinguishability of N-EKE-D and two N-EKE-M variants that exploits the definition of partnering in their security model.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings - 2009 International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops, WAINA 2009 |
Pages | 147-152 |
Number of pages | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops 2009 - Bradford, United Kingdom Duration: 26 May 2009 → 29 May 2009 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/5136571/proceeding (Proceedings) |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA |
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ISSN (Print) | 1550-445X |
Conference
Conference | International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops 2009 |
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Abbreviated title | WAINA 2009 |
Country/Territory | United Kingdom |
City | Bradford |
Period | 26/05/09 → 29/05/09 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- Cryptanalysis
- Group
- Key indistinguishability
- Model
- Password-authenticated key exchange
- Proof
- Undetectable online dictionary attack