Security of a leakage-resilient protocol for key establishment and mutual authentication

Raphael C.W. Phan, Kim Kwang Raymond Choo, Swee Huay Heng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We revisit Shin et al.'s leakage-resilient password-based authenticated key establishment protocol (LR-AKEP) and the security model used to prove the security of LR-AKEP. By refining the Leak oracle in the security model, we show that LR-AKE (1) can, in fact, achieve a stronger notion of leakage-resilience than initially claimed and (2) also achieve an additional feature of traceability, not previously mentioned.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProvable Security - First International Conference, ProvSec 2007, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer
Pages169-177
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)9783540756699
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Conference on Provable Security 2007 - Wollongong, Australia
Duration: 1 Nov 20072 Nov 2007
Conference number: 1st
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-540-75670-5 (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4784 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Provable Security 2007
Abbreviated titleProvSec 2007
Country/TerritoryAustralia
CityWollongong
Period1/11/072/11/07
Internet address

Keywords

  • Key establishment
  • Leakage-resilient
  • Mutual athentication

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