Abstract
We revisit Shin et al.'s leakage-resilient password-based authenticated key establishment protocol (LR-AKEP) and the security model used to prove the security of LR-AKEP. By refining the Leak oracle in the security model, we show that LR-AKE (1) can, in fact, achieve a stronger notion of leakage-resilience than initially claimed and (2) also achieve an additional feature of traceability, not previously mentioned.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Provable Security - First International Conference, ProvSec 2007, Proceedings |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 169-177 |
Number of pages | 9 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783540756699 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | International Conference on Provable Security 2007 - Wollongong, Australia Duration: 1 Nov 2007 → 2 Nov 2007 Conference number: 1st https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-540-75670-5 (Proceedings) |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 4784 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | International Conference on Provable Security 2007 |
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Abbreviated title | ProvSec 2007 |
Country/Territory | Australia |
City | Wollongong |
Period | 1/11/07 → 2/11/07 |
Internet address |
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Keywords
- Key establishment
- Leakage-resilient
- Mutual athentication