Security analysis of (Un-) fair non-repudiation protocols

Sigrid Gürgens, Carsten Rudolph

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An approach to protocol analysis using asynchronous product automata (APA) and the simple homomorphism verification tool (SHVT) is demonstrated on several variants of the well known Zhou-Gollmann fair non-repudiation protocol. Attacks on these protocols are presented, that, to our knowledge, have not been published before. Finally, an improved version of the protocol is proposed.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFormal Aspects of Security
Subtitle of host publicationFirst International Conference, FASec 2002 London, UK, December 16-18, 2002 Revised Papers
EditorsAli E. Abdallah, Peter Ryan, Steve Schneider
Place of PublicationBerlin Germany
PublisherSpringer
Pages97-114
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)3540206930
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2003
Externally publishedYes
EventFormal Aspects of Security 2002 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: 16 Dec 200218 Dec 2002
Conference number: 1st
https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/book/10.1007/b94774 (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume2629
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Conference

ConferenceFormal Aspects of Security 2002
Abbreviated titleFASec 2002
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period16/12/0218/12/02
Internet address

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