Abstract
User revocation is one of the main security issues in publish and subscribe (pub/sub) systems. Indeed, to ensure data confidentiality, the system should be able to remove malicious subscribers without affecting the functionalities and decoupling of authorised subscribers and publishers. To revoke a user, there are solutions, but existing schemes inevitably introduce high computation and communication overheads, which can ultimately affect the system capabilities. In this paper, we propose a novel revocation technique for pub/sub systems that can efficiently remove compromised subscribers without requiring regeneration and redistribution of new keys as well as re-encryption of existing data with those keys. Our proposed solution is such that a subscriber's interest is not revealed to curious brokers and published data can only be accessed by the authorised subscribers. Finally, the proposed protocol is secure against the collusion attacks between brokers and revoked subscribers.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing |
Editors | Dongwan Shin, Maria Lencastre |
Place of Publication | New York NY USA |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) |
Pages | 388-394 |
Number of pages | 7 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450351911 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | ACM Symposium on Applied Computing 2018 - Pau, France Duration: 9 Apr 2018 → 13 Apr 2018 Conference number: 33rd https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1145/3167132 (Proceedings) https://www.sigapp.org/sac/sac2018/ (Website) |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing |
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Conference
Conference | ACM Symposium on Applied Computing 2018 |
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Abbreviated title | SAC 2018 |
Country/Territory | France |
City | Pau |
Period | 9/04/18 → 13/04/18 |
Internet address |
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Keywords
- Collusion resistance
- Publications' confidentiality
- Secure pub/sub
- Subscribers' privacy