TY - JOUR
T1 - Search platforms
T2 - showrooming and price parity clauses
AU - Wang, Chengsi
AU - Wright, Julian
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.
AB - We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85081614434&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/1756-2171.12305
DO - 10.1111/1756-2171.12305
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85081614434
SN - 0741-6261
VL - 51
SP - 32
EP - 58
JO - RAND Journal of Economics
JF - RAND Journal of Economics
IS - 1
ER -