Abstract
T. M. Scanlon claims that insofar as 'having a desire' is understood as a state that is distinct from 'seeing something as a reason,' it plays almost no role in the justification and explanation of action. Since in the standard story of action desire is understood as a behavioral disposition, and since in that story every action is explained by desire, so understood, and since a desire so understood is a distinct state from seeing something as a reason, it follows that Scanlon sets himself against the standard story of action. In my paper I begin by explaining the attractions of the standard story of action and then I examine Scanlon's reasons for thinking that desire, understood in the way in which it is in that story, plays almost no role in the explanation of action.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Reasons and Recognition |
Subtitle of host publication | Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon |
Publisher | Oxford University Press, USA |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780199918829 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199753673 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Desire
- Explanation
- Hume
- Justification
- Like
- Reason
- Scanlon
- Want