Abstract
We undertake an experiment to explore shareholder voting behaviour when the pay-performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package evidencing a strong pay-performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces the effect of the pay-performance link on voting intentions. Accounting and Finance
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 943-970 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | Accounting & Finance |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue number | S1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2020 |
Keywords
- Executive remuneration
- Pay-performance link
- Say-on-pay
- Two-strikes rule