Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections

Michelle Blom; Peter J. Stuckey; Vanessa Teague; Damjan Vukcevic

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6

Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections

Michelle Blom, Peter J. Stuckey, Vanessa Teague, Damjan Vukcevic

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

Abstract

Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors’ intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2023 International Workshops
Subtitle of host publication	Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC Bol, Braˇc, Croatia, May 5, 2023 Revised Selected Papers
Editors	Aleksander Essex, Shin’ichiro Matsuo, Oksana Kulyk, Lewis Gudgeon, Ariah Klages-Mundt, Daniel Perez, Sam Werner, Andrea Bracciali, Geoff Goodell
Place of Publication	Cham Switzerland
Publisher	Springer
Pages	79-94
Number of pages	16
ISBN (Electronic)	9783031488061
ISBN (Print)	9783031488054
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6
Publication status	Published - 2024
Event	Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting 2023 - Bol, Croatia Duration: 1 May 2023 → 5 May 2023 Conference number: 8th https://fc23.ifca.ai/voting/ (Website) https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1 (Proceedings)

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
Volume	13953
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting 2023
Abbreviated title	Voting 2023
Country/Territory	Croatia
City	Bol
Period	1/05/23 → 5/05/23
Internet address	https://fc23.ifca.ai/voting/ (Website) https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1 (Proceedings)

Keywords

Condorcet Elections
Instant-Runoff Voting
Ranked Pairs
Risk-Limiting Audits

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6

Cite this

Blom, M., Stuckey, P. J., Teague, V., & Vukcevic, D. (2024). Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections. In A. Essex, S. Matsuo, O. Kulyk, L. Gudgeon, A. Klages-Mundt, D. Perez, S. Werner, A. Bracciali, & G. Goodell (Eds.), Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2023 International Workshops: Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC Bol, Braˇc, Croatia, May 5, 2023 Revised Selected Papers (pp. 79-94). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 13953). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6

Blom, Michelle ; Stuckey, Peter J. ; Teague, Vanessa et al. / Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections. Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2023 International Workshops: Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC Bol, Braˇc, Croatia, May 5, 2023 Revised Selected Papers. editor / Aleksander Essex ; Shin’ichiro Matsuo ; Oksana Kulyk ; Lewis Gudgeon ; Ariah Klages-Mundt ; Daniel Perez ; Sam Werner ; Andrea Bracciali ; Geoff Goodell. Cham Switzerland : Springer, 2024. pp. 79-94 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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abstract = "Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors{\textquoteright} intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.",

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author = "Michelle Blom and Stuckey, {Peter J.} and Vanessa Teague and Damjan Vukcevic",

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Blom, M, Stuckey, PJ, Teague, V & Vukcevic, D 2024, Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections. in A Essex, S Matsuo, O Kulyk, L Gudgeon, A Klages-Mundt, D Perez, S Werner, A Bracciali & G Goodell (eds), Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2023 International Workshops: Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC Bol, Braˇc, Croatia, May 5, 2023 Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 13953, Springer, Cham Switzerland, pp. 79-94, Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting 2023, Bol, Croatia, 1/05/23. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6

Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections. / Blom, Michelle; Stuckey, Peter J.; Teague, Vanessa et al.
Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2023 International Workshops: Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC Bol, Braˇc, Croatia, May 5, 2023 Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Aleksander Essex; Shin’ichiro Matsuo; Oksana Kulyk; Lewis Gudgeon; Ariah Klages-Mundt; Daniel Perez; Sam Werner; Andrea Bracciali; Geoff Goodell. Cham Switzerland: Springer, 2024. p. 79-94 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 13953).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

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AU - Stuckey, Peter J.

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AU - Vukcevic, Damjan

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Blom M, Stuckey PJ, Teague V, Vukcevic D. Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections. In Essex A, Matsuo S, Kulyk O, Gudgeon L, Klages-Mundt A, Perez D, Werner S, Bracciali A, Goodell G, editors, Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2023 International Workshops: Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC Bol, Braˇc, Croatia, May 5, 2023 Revised Selected Papers. Cham Switzerland: Springer. 2024. p. 79-94. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6

Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

Access to Document

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In for the count: Maximising trust and reliability in Australian elections

ARC Training Centre in Optimisation Technologies, Integrated Methodologies, and Applications (OPTIMA)

Cite this

Risk-limiting audits for Condorcet elections

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Projects

In for the count: Maximising trust and reliability in Australian elections

ARC Training Centre in Optimisation Technologies, Integrated Methodologies, and Applications (OPTIMA)

Cite this