Abstract
It is often said that there is no appearance/reality distinction with respect to consciousness. Call this claim 'nard'. In contemporary discussions, nard is closely connected to the thesis of revelation, the claim that the essences of phenomenal properties are revealed in experience, though the connection between the two requires clarification. This chapter distinguishes different versions of nard and homes in on a particular version that is closely connected to revelation. It shows how revelation and the related version of nard pose a threat to physicalism. Responses from physicalism and their limitations are also considered.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind |
Subtitle of host publication | Volume 4 |
Editors | Uriah Kriegel |
Place of Publication | New York NY USA |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Chapter | 11 |
Pages | 380-413 |
Number of pages | 34 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198924159 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198924128 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Keywords
- Appearance/reality distinction
- Grounding physicalism
- Identity physicalism
- Phenomenal properties
- Revelation