Resolving the credibility problem of an honest government: A case for foreign investment subsidy

Sugata Marjit, Yew Kwang Ng, Udo Broll, Bhaswar Moitra

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


We develop a simple model of direct foreign investment where the host country government cannot credibly signal its honest intention such as to stick to the contracted tax rate. The foreign firm has some prior belief regarding the ex post discretionary policies of the local government. Since the investment is completely irreversible, such a belief pattern might not induce the firm to invest in a country which badly needs it. It is shown that the host government can design a subsidy scheme which might attract foreign investment by removing the credibility problem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)625-631
Number of pages7
JournalReview of International Economics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Cite this