Abstract
Philosophers in the Western and Eastern traditions have been concerned with the question: What, if anything, does the term ‘I’ refer to? This article investigates reasons offered for a negative answer to this question. Western philosophers argue that the descriptive content associated with the term ‘I’ is too minimal to support reference to a reidentifiable particular. Classical Buddhists in the Indian tradition offer a novel reason for why the term lacks a reference. The term ‘I’ does not have a referent not because it is unmediated by representations but because the representations (in the Buddhist case the exclusions) associated with the term ‘I’ systematically misrepresent or mis-describe the object it supposedly refers to. There are no reidentifiable particulars.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 38-56 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Philosophy East and West |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2021 |
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