Real‐time social selection maintains honesty of a dynamic visual signal in cooperative fish

Judith C Bachmann, Fabio Cortesi, Matthew David Hall, N Justin Marshall, Walter Salzburger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Our understanding of animal communication has been largely driven by advances in theory since empirical evidence has been difficult to obtain. Costly signaling theory became the dominant paradigm explaining the evolution of honest signals, according to which communication reliability relies on differential costs imposed on signalers to distinguish animals of different quality. On the other hand, mathematical models disagree on the source of costs at the communication equilibrium. Here, we present an empirical framework to study the evolution of honest signals that generates predictions on the form, function, and sources of reliability of visual signals. We test these predictions on the facial color patterns of the cooperatively breeding Princess of Burundi cichlid, Neolamprologus brichardi. Using theoretical visual models and behavioral experiments we show that these patterns possess stable chromatic properties for efficient transmission in the aquatic environment, while dynamic changes in signal luminance are used by the fish to communicate switches in aggressive intent. By manipulating signal into out‐of‐equilibrium expression and simulating a cheater invasion, we demonstrate that social costs (receiver retaliation) promote the honesty of this dynamic conventional signal. By directly probing the sender of a signal in real time, social selection is likely to be the mechanism of choice shaping the evolution of inexpensive, yet reliable context‐dependent social signals in general.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)269-278
Number of pages10
JournalEvolution Letters
Volume1
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2017

Keywords

  • Costly signaling theory
  • conventional signal
  • cichlid
  • Neolamprologus
  • out-of-equilibrium
  • pigmentation
  • receiver retaliation costs
  • reliability
  • strategic costs
  • visual model

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