Rationality and worldview

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Abstract

This chapter argues against the view that there is a particular set of worldview beliefs that is uniquely privileged when it comes to rationality and support by cogent arguments. The chapter begins with a simple model in which two competing worldviews are consistent and coherent, and neither has an advantage over the other with respect to rationality and support by cogent arguments. It is argued that the removal of simplifying assumptions—or equivalently, the addition of further constraints—does nothing to defeat the view that competing worldviews are on a par when it comes to rationality and support by cogent arguments. It is then argued that widening our focus does nothing to defeat the view that our best competing worldviews are on a par when it comes to rationality and support by cogent arguments. Finally, considerations about the assessment of competing worldviews suggests that we have pretty good reason to suppose that best competing worldviews actually are on a par when it comes to rationality and support by cogent arguments.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRenewing Philosophy of Religion:
Subtitle of host publicationExploratory Essays
EditorsPaul Draper, J. L. Schellenberg
Place of PublicationOxford UK
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter10
Pages174-186
Number of pages13
Edition1st
ISBN (Print)9780198738909
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • argument
  • coherent
  • consistent
  • competing
  • uniquely privileged
  • rationality
  • theoretically virtuous
  • worldview
  • on a par

Cite this

Oppy, G. R. (2017). Rationality and worldview. In P. Draper, & J. L. Schellenberg (Eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays (1st ed., pp. 174-186). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198738909.003.0011