Abstract
In this work, we investigate how to protect public key encryption from both key-leakage attacks and tampering attacks. First, we formalize the notions of chosen ciphertext (CCA) security against key-leakage and tampering attacks. To this goal, we then introduce the concept of key-homomorphic hash proof systems and present a generic construction of public key encryption based on this new primitive. Our construction, compared with previous works, realizes leakage-resilience and tampering-resilience simultaneously but completely independently, so it can tolerate a larger amount of bounded-memory leakage and be instantiated with more flexibility. Moreover, it allows for an unbounded number of affine-tampering queries, even after the challenge phase. With slight adaptations, our construction also achieves CCA security against subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage attacks and a polynomial of affine-tampering attacks. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we get the first public key encryption scheme secure against both auxiliary-input leakage attacks and tampering attacks.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 142-156 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Journal of Computer and System Sciences |
Volume | 89 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Chosen-ciphertext security
- Hash proof system
- Key-leakage attack
- Public key encryption
- Tampering attack