Public key encryption resilient to leakage and tampering attacks

Shi-Feng Sun, Dawu Gu, Udaya Parampalli, Yu Yu, Baodong Qin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

In this work, we investigate how to protect public key encryption from both key-leakage attacks and tampering attacks. First, we formalize the notions of chosen ciphertext (CCA) security against key-leakage and tampering attacks. To this goal, we then introduce the concept of key-homomorphic hash proof systems and present a generic construction of public key encryption based on this new primitive. Our construction, compared with previous works, realizes leakage-resilience and tampering-resilience simultaneously but completely independently, so it can tolerate a larger amount of bounded-memory leakage and be instantiated with more flexibility. Moreover, it allows for an unbounded number of affine-tampering queries, even after the challenge phase. With slight adaptations, our construction also achieves CCA security against subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage attacks and a polynomial of affine-tampering attacks. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we get the first public key encryption scheme secure against both auxiliary-input leakage attacks and tampering attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)142-156
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Computer and System Sciences
Volume89
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Chosen-ciphertext security
  • Hash proof system
  • Key-leakage attack
  • Public key encryption
  • Tampering attack

Cite this

Sun, Shi-Feng ; Gu, Dawu ; Parampalli, Udaya ; Yu, Yu ; Qin, Baodong. / Public key encryption resilient to leakage and tampering attacks. In: Journal of Computer and System Sciences. 2017 ; Vol. 89. pp. 142-156.
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Public key encryption resilient to leakage and tampering attacks. / Sun, Shi-Feng; Gu, Dawu; Parampalli, Udaya; Yu, Yu; Qin, Baodong.

In: Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Vol. 89, 01.11.2017, p. 142-156.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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