Proxy re-signatures in the standard model

Sherman S.M. Chow, Raphael C.W. Phan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies proxy re-signature schemes. We first classify the expected security notions for proxy re-signature schemes with different properties. We then show how to attack on a recently proposed bidirectional scheme that is purported to be secure without random oracles, and discuss the flaw in their proof. Next, we show how to design a generic unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme using a new primitive called homomorphic compartment signature as the building block. We give a concrete instantiation which yields the first known unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme which is proven secure under standard assumption in the standard model. We also discuss how to incorporate the concept of forward-security into the proxy re-signature paradigm, such that the signing and the transformation are both time-limited.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security - 11th International Conference, ISC 2008, Proceedings
Pages260-276
Number of pages17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes
EventInformation Security Conference 2008 - Taipei, Taiwan
Duration: 15 Sept 200818 Sept 2008
Conference number: 11th
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-540-85886-7 (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5222 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

ConferenceInformation Security Conference 2008
Abbreviated titleISC 2008
Country/TerritoryTaiwan
CityTaipei
Period15/09/0818/09/08
Internet address

Keywords

  • Compartment signature
  • Proxy re-signature
  • Standard model

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