Abstract
This paper studies proxy re-signature schemes. We first classify the expected security notions for proxy re-signature schemes with different properties. We then show how to attack on a recently proposed bidirectional scheme that is purported to be secure without random oracles, and discuss the flaw in their proof. Next, we show how to design a generic unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme using a new primitive called homomorphic compartment signature as the building block. We give a concrete instantiation which yields the first known unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme which is proven secure under standard assumption in the standard model. We also discuss how to incorporate the concept of forward-security into the proxy re-signature paradigm, such that the signing and the transformation are both time-limited.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Information Security - 11th International Conference, ISC 2008, Proceedings |
Pages | 260-276 |
Number of pages | 17 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2008 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | Information Security Conference 2008 - Taipei, Taiwan Duration: 15 Sept 2008 → 18 Sept 2008 Conference number: 11th https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-540-85886-7 (Proceedings) |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 5222 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | Information Security Conference 2008 |
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Abbreviated title | ISC 2008 |
Country/Territory | Taiwan |
City | Taipei |
Period | 15/09/08 → 18/09/08 |
Internet address |
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Keywords
- Compartment signature
- Proxy re-signature
- Standard model