Practical beliefs vs scientific beliefs: Two kinds of maximization

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

There are two kinds of beliefs. If the ultimate objective is wellbeing (utility), the generated beliefs are practical. If the ultimate objective is truth, the generated beliefs are scientific. This article defends the practical/scientific belief distinction. The proposed distinction has been ignored by standard rational choice theory?as well as by its two major critics, viz., the Tversky/Kahneman program and the Simon/Gigerenzer program. One ramification of the proposed distinction is clear: agents who make errors with regard to scientific beliefs (e.g., the conjunction fallacy) should not be taken as committing irrationality - because they are most probably engaging the other kind of maximization, the pursuit of wellbeing.
LanguageEnglish
Pages107 - 126
Number of pages20
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

Cite this

@article{4d147f27bbf247d9a684d42c7e69339c,
title = "Practical beliefs vs scientific beliefs: Two kinds of maximization",
abstract = "There are two kinds of beliefs. If the ultimate objective is wellbeing (utility), the generated beliefs are practical. If the ultimate objective is truth, the generated beliefs are scientific. This article defends the practical/scientific belief distinction. The proposed distinction has been ignored by standard rational choice theory?as well as by its two major critics, viz., the Tversky/Kahneman program and the Simon/Gigerenzer program. One ramification of the proposed distinction is clear: agents who make errors with regard to scientific beliefs (e.g., the conjunction fallacy) should not be taken as committing irrationality - because they are most probably engaging the other kind of maximization, the pursuit of wellbeing.",
author = "Khalil, {Elias Lafi}",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z",
language = "English",
volume = "74",
pages = "107 -- 126",
journal = "Theory and Decision",
issn = "0040-5833",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag London Ltd.",
number = "1",

}

Practical beliefs vs scientific beliefs: Two kinds of maximization. / Khalil, Elias Lafi.

In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 74, No. 1, 2013, p. 107 - 126.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Practical beliefs vs scientific beliefs: Two kinds of maximization

AU - Khalil,Elias Lafi

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - There are two kinds of beliefs. If the ultimate objective is wellbeing (utility), the generated beliefs are practical. If the ultimate objective is truth, the generated beliefs are scientific. This article defends the practical/scientific belief distinction. The proposed distinction has been ignored by standard rational choice theory?as well as by its two major critics, viz., the Tversky/Kahneman program and the Simon/Gigerenzer program. One ramification of the proposed distinction is clear: agents who make errors with regard to scientific beliefs (e.g., the conjunction fallacy) should not be taken as committing irrationality - because they are most probably engaging the other kind of maximization, the pursuit of wellbeing.

AB - There are two kinds of beliefs. If the ultimate objective is wellbeing (utility), the generated beliefs are practical. If the ultimate objective is truth, the generated beliefs are scientific. This article defends the practical/scientific belief distinction. The proposed distinction has been ignored by standard rational choice theory?as well as by its two major critics, viz., the Tversky/Kahneman program and the Simon/Gigerenzer program. One ramification of the proposed distinction is clear: agents who make errors with regard to scientific beliefs (e.g., the conjunction fallacy) should not be taken as committing irrationality - because they are most probably engaging the other kind of maximization, the pursuit of wellbeing.

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z

DO - 10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z

M3 - Article

VL - 74

SP - 107

EP - 126

JO - Theory and Decision

T2 - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 1

ER -